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Moral generalism and particularism are two positions in meta-ethics which have different 
views regarding the relation between moral thought and principles. By accepting this 
relationship, generalists emphasize the necessity of principles in decision making process, 
and claim that the rationality of moral thought depends on the provision of a suitable 
supply of moral principles. In contrast, particularists have rejected, or at least doubted, 
the existence of moral principles, and believe that the rationality of moral thought 
depends on recognizing special features of a case and relevant conditions. This is why, 
unlike generalists, they use case study method rather than syllogism in decision making 
process and moral judgment. Consequently, to support their view, particularists 
commonly resort to holism in the theory of reasons, while atomism is in support of 
generalism. To evaluate these two attitudes, this study surveys some arguments that 
particularists and generalists proposed to justify their view and criticize the rival’s one, 
and also explains their positions concerning the epistemological and metaphysical role of 
moral principles and reasons. Finally, after evaluating their claims, the importance of 
both approaches in meta-ethics is stressed. 
Keywords: moral generalism, moral particularism, moral principles, moral reasons, 
holism, atomism  
1. Introduction 
Generalism and particularism are two widely discussed approaches in meta-ethics which 
make diverse assertions regarding the place of moral principles. Generalists insist that the 
presence of principles in decision making process is necessary and that merely on the 
basis of principles, rationality of moral thought would be possible. Unlike them, 
particularists, by negation of the relationship between moral thought and principles, 
regard the existence of principles in ethics to be impossible, unnecessary, and inefficient. 
The first lot maintain that the evaluation and justification of moral beliefs and actions and 
also recognition of the moral duties would be possible merely on the basis of principles. 
Consequently, they accept deductive inference as the method of moral reasoning. The 
second group believe that moral thought does not depend, in any way, on the suitable 
provision of moral principles and applying principles to particular cases, and think that 
moral understanding and judgment is possible only when particular conditions and 
features are considered. Thus, they regard the case study method as efficient. 
In spite of serious divergence of views, both of them know themselves as defenders of 
ethics, and consider the defence of their certain approach to be a defence of ethics, and 
accuse the other side of making errors in moral decision making. Generalists consider 
that the refutation of rationality is an immediate consequence of particularism, and on the   
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basis of atomism in theory of reasons, support the generalism. Particularists, on the other 
hand, through accusing generalists of neglecting particular truths and certain conditions, 
put forward holism in support of their attitude. 
Although generalists, or in other words, principlists, have contrasting views about 
meaning, scope, and domain of moral principles, all normative theories can be considered 
to somewhat as defenders of moral principles. 
Since 1980’s, particularism has been widely defended by several thinkers, including 
Jonathan Dancy, Robert Audi, John McDowell, David McNaughton, and Margaret Olivia 
Little. 
This paper will scrutinize two aforementioned approaches and the arguments generalists 
and particularists presented to justify their attitude and to criticize the rival’s one. Taking 
into consideration that generalists regard ethical principles as necessary both 
epistemologically and metaphysically and particularists opposed them in both of these 
aspects, this problem specifically will be discussed. The study of the function of 
generalists and particularists and evaluation of their claims manifests that none of them is 
committed to principles and theoretical foundation of its approach. Neither do generalists 
neglect particular truth absolutely, nor do particularists see principles to be redundant and 
unnecessary. 
At the conclusion, the importance of these two attitudes is emphasized and the necessity 
of considering principles and particular cases in moral thought is indicated as well. The 
standpoints of Dancy, because of their significance, are examined more than the rest. 
2. Generalism and Moral Principles 
In responding to three questions, generalists view three principles as vital: What is it to be 
a moral person? How ought one to make moral decisions? And how is it possible for an 
action to be right or wrong? According to their beliefs, an unprincipled person is one not 
to be trusted, the right way to think morally is to be capable of applying principles to any 
new situation and to appeal to principles in decision making process and in moral 
judgment. Therefore, justification of rightness or wrongness of acts, evaluation of moral 
behaviours, and understanding that what we ought to do while facing difficulties is 
entirely impossible without principles and general rules. And in a more theoretical way, 
without principles, there is no distinction between right and wrong. 
Generalists believe that overlooking general rules and principles and personalizing moral 
deductions have confronted ethics with danger of relativism and will result in scepticism 
(Beauchamp 2003); they attach a great importance to this explanation rather than pointing 
out that ethical generality facilitates the teaching of ethics, the guidance of moral 
decisions, the justification of moral judgments, and the formulation of laws and social 
policies (Hooker 2000; Goldman 2002; Nozick 1993). 
Generalists, in general, find the existence of principles essential in ethics from 
epistemological and metaphysical aspects. On the one hand, they say that there would be 
no possibility to make a distinction between right and wrong actions and actually, the 
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rightness or wrongness of an act is determined by its connection to the principles. 
According to this, it is adequate only to recognize those principles the case falls under. 
And then by syllogism, everyone can easily infer the rightness or wrongness of the very 
action. 
On the other hand, given that there is a distinction between right and wrong actions, there 
must be a detectable difference between the properties of the right ones and the properties 
of the wrong ones. Naturalists tend to justify moral properties on the basis of natural 
properties. In this approach, descriptive properties are detectable, and moral principles 
specify such regulations. Indeed, principles connect moral properties to non-moral ones 
(Dancy 2005). For instance, assisting others may be right because it is pleasant. To 
support their approach, generalists enjoy the atomism and apply it to both theory of 
normative reasons and theory of value. Atomism in the theory of reasons says: “a feature 
that is a reason in one case must remain a reason, and retain the same polarity, in any 
other” (Dancy 2004; 2007). Consequently, whenever and wherever the very act occurs, 
invariability and similarity of feature or features is the reason of the rightness or 
wrongness of the act and the reason for or against doing it. It is worth noting that 
generalists in regard with principles are either monists or pluralists. Immanuel Kant and 
David Ross are two notable instances of these two different approaches. Kant, contrary to 
Ross, is a monist as to moral principles, and holds that all moral principles refer to a 
priori principle, that is, a categorical imperative which is the source of all principles and 
rules that are absolute and unconditional. 
Ross declares that morality is composed of an irreducible plurality of principles that do 
not come in a strict order of priority (Ross Sec. 20). Thus as to moral principles, he is a 
pluralist, and after dividing duties into prima facie and duties in practice, he puts forward 
seven principles as primary ones. All primary principles are of the same significance. But 
in practice, a certain act might be an instance of more than one principle; and therefore, 
principles will be in conflict with each other, for example, a given act might be an 
instance of inflicting a torment on others so that we know it is wrong, but at the same 
time may be considered moral because of protecting yourself and others. Stealing, being 
unfaithful, lying, and several moral or immoral cases can be different from our original 
judgment in special cases. According to Rossian generalism, whether an act is morally 
permissible or not depends on the interaction of all these principles. And every one 
should always do what the balance or mix of moral considerations demands in the case 
(Hooker 2000). This is why Robert Audi knows Ross as an epistemological particularist 
(Audi 2006). Nevertheless, particularists regard him as a generalist because of his belief 
in general principles (Dancy 2004; Audi 2006). 
Monistic approach in decision making process and moral judgment requires to be 
impossible, for a given case to fall under more than one principle. And according to 
pluralistic approach, one has to decide which principle, of all those that apply, is the 
dominant one in this case, and this would require more than subsumption, or, like Ross 
should say, after evaluating conditions, intuition of moral duty is needed. 
3. Particularism in Contrast with Generalism 
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Particularists, contrary to generalists, neither hold that the moral person is someone who 
has principles nor that the moral judgment is equivalent to application of principles. In 
spite of various expressions of this opposition, the standpoint of particularism is known 
as a negative attitude toward principles. According to John McDowel (1979), 
particularists believe that for evaluating the rationality of attitudes, we do not need 
principles and we cannot need them. 
Particularists do not accept the role and the significance of principles neither 
epistemologically nor metaphysically. For this reason, they challenge generalism both 
from the aspect of reasoning method and justification of its approach. Thus, to recognize 
whether X is right or wrong, it is necessary that all principles that apply to each case must 
be absolute and decisive, in the sense that either each case falls under one principle or 
while the principles are plural, superiority of one of them should be proved. However, 
herein lies the difficulty since none of the principles are decisive, and always it is 
possible that several principles simultaneously apply to the same case and they are in 
opposition to each other, i.e., some principles state that X is right and others vice versa. 
The reason of compatibility of one act with numerous principles is that any act might 
have several aspects that each one is related to another principle. On the one hand, 
abortion, for example, is wrong because it is an instance of murder, and on the other 
hand, according to the principle of respect for autonomy, is right. 
Generalists, due to plurality of principles and conflict between them in practice, and 
being failed in showing a way to release from the conflict, have encountered serious 
difficulties in the decision making process and moral judgment. Besides, particularists 
believe that the epistemology originated from principles is not persuasive , since by mere 
reliance on general principles and turning a blind eye to particular truths and certain 
conditions, one cannot make proper decisions in order to know whether the act X is right 
or wrong. Generalists’ boundless indication on principles caused particularists to say that 
they look away conditions and details, and this might result in wrong moral decisions; 
because of relying on a few rules, generalists arrive at similar decisions in dissimilar 
situations that might be mistakes due to their unconsciousness about alteration of 
reasoning under new circumstances (Dancy 1993). 
Generally speaking, to confront generalism, particularists have two options: either try to 
show that the suggested principles are not so flexible to cover the ground, or to claim that 
there is no reason, whatever, to suppose that morality stands or falls with a supply of 
principles capable of doing the job required of them. In this case, they must depict that 
how ethics can work without principles. 
Some particularists have chosen the first method and pointed out some counter-examples 
implying the erroneous application of a principle to a moral action, and thereby question 
the generality of principles and moral rules (Shafer-Landau 1997) like sadistic pleasures 
that violate the principle of maximizing pleasure. 
Another group do not consider this reason adequate in defending particularism (Hooker, 
and Little 2000), and in spite of utilizing it for justifying holism, do not regard it as valid. 
Some thinkers, including Dancy, chose the second method and replaced holism in the 
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theory of reasons with atomism and considered it as the rejection of generalism. Holism 
in normative reasons indicates that a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason 
at all, or an opposite reason in another (Dancy 1993; 2004). 
In this theory, everything is dependent on conditions; and the reasons are sensitive to 
context. Particularists welcome to this approach (Hooker, and Little 2000; Lance, and 
Little 2006; Audi 2006; McNaughton 1988). This group, in contrast to generalists who 
viewed that moral rationality is necessarily based on the existence of a suitable supply of 
moral principles and held that moral principles necessarily behave in regular ways, find 
moral reasons to be the sum of certain properties of each case that probably alter in 
different situations. Therefore, they assert repeatedly that it is not necessary for a moral 
reason to remain fixed and stable. In this approach, they devote a lot of effort to 
demonstrate the incorrectness of atomism in different ways, because annulment of 
atomism as the supporter theory of generalism will result in annulment of the generalism 
itself. 
One of the criticisms of generalists against particularism is that they deny the rationality 
of moral thought. Thinking rationally requires at least that one think consistently, and in 
ethics, we are required to apply our principles consistently, that is, to apply the same 
principle to similar cases and decisive features would remain in various conditions, it 
means to take the same feature to be the same reason, wherever it occurs. To demonstrate 
that this claim is not realistic, Dancy employs the distinction that generalists have drawn 
between moral and non-moral thinking. Rejecting this distinction, he comes to the 
conclusion that the generalists’ understanding of the rationality of moral thought is 
mistaken. In his view, their major difficulty is that they, after distinguishing between 
these two kinds of thinking, made use of atomism merely to support moral thought. For 
rejecting this type of thinking, he refers to the distinction drawn by generalists between 
theoretical reasons and practical reasons or reasons for belief and reasons for action. 
Generalists, at the same time, do not defend atomism as a theory about reasons for belief 
and maintain that reasons for belief possibly alter under various circumstances; but 
believe this is not true about reasons for action because according to them, reasons for 
action always work in a same way. Thus, principle of “lying is wrong” indicates that if an 
act necessitates lying, this principle always will be a reason against it. Dancy rejects the 
difference between reasons for belief and reasons for action in dependency on 
circumstances, and holds that both of reasons are sensitive to context. Then this fact is 
that atomism is not true about the reasons for belief, and the defender of this sort of 
reasons is holism, similarly this is true of moral reasons. 
To justify the aforementioned standpoint about reasons for belief, he gives an example of 
a red thing, ordinarily, whose red appearance is some reason to believe it is red. But what 
if I have taken a drug that makes red things look blue and blue things look red? Thus 
when it seems red to me, this is a reason that it is blue and vice versa. Dancy holds that 
this example indicates that both reasons for belief and reasons for action are sensitive to 
context. 
The main reason of particularists in rejecting the above-mentioned distinction is that there 
is no reason proving that moral reasons function in a radically different way from other 
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reasons. The chief concern of particularists about accepting this distinction, which means 
stability of moral reasons, is to be obliged to accept atomism or at least a hybrid 
conception of rationality, which requires that any type of thought (moral and non-moral) 
have its own special logic; and this is unreasonable. For this reason, Dancy considers 
defeating atomism as the only way to vanquish principlism and holds that it is the 
falsehood of atomism, not the incorrectness of moral principles that resulted in accepting 
holism in reasons (Dancy 2004; 2007). 
4. Holism in the Theory of Reasons and the Theory of Value 
Particularists believe that holism, instead of atomism, is true in the theory of reasons and 
the theory of value. They state, like generalists, that moral agent is sensitive to the moral 
reasons present in the case, but draw a different image of this sensitivity. In this image, 
function of moral reasons is not different from other reasons and contrary to generalism 
which accepts the similarity of performance of reasons, in their view, features have 
variable relevance that can make one moral difference in one case and an another one in 
another case. 
Therefore, holism in the theory of normative reasons consists of two points: (1) The way 
in which reasons are combined, is not necessarily determined or combined; (2) One thing 
might be a reason in a case and not in another one, in a sense that possibly, a property 
causes goodness of an act and in another case, badness of it, or causes no difference at 
all. Contrary to generalists who maintain that some features are morally speaking in 
favour of the action, and another ones against it wherever it occurs (Dancy 1993; 2004), 
particularists hold that maybe a feature in some situation is in favour of it and opposite it 
in another (Dancy 1993; 2004; 2007). 
Particularism is a pluralistic approach regarding properties, and believes that in each case, 
there is more than one morally relevant property, and it possibly applies to an act in this 
case and does not in another, i.e., even probably oppose it. What causes a property of an 
act to be regarded as a different reason in a new situation is the changing of 
circumstances that can affect the correctness of faithfulness or incorrectness of theft, for 
example. 
Consequently, moral thought does not depend on application of principles in any way, 
and we do not need a set of common elements and paradigms in order to distinguish right 
from wrong, but in any case, one should know the moral truths that are the basis of an 
knowledge. Recognizing these truths constitutes our normative knowledge. Thus in 
understanding the practical purport of a concept such as cruelty, he observes differences 
making him abandon the cruel action. In general, according to particularists’ view about 
moral deliberation, through knowing the essence of the case before me, we shall be 
capable of knowing that whether a given act is right or wrong and therefore, moral 
judgment means sensitivity to the essence of a situation we are in (Dancy 2004; 2005; 
Lance, and Little 2004). 
Particularists, of course, accept that possibly there would be features that are moral 
reasons wherever occur (Dancy 1993; 2004). Dancy knows these reasons to be invariant, 
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and does not advance any kind of reasoning implying that similar reasons do not exist at 
all, nevertheless, does not consider this similarity to be due to the existence of moral 
principles. Therefore, he says that it is possible for one feature to perform similarly in 
two various situations, and does not mean by this that it must function invariably. This 
possibility does not necessitate the acceptance of atomism and moral principles, but only 
requires that there be probably general statements that function in the same way. 
Wrongness of torturing a child is an example of cases that is exactly the same in various 
conditions, but here like everywhere, the act of torturing a child itself is the reason of its 
wrongness, and that how it functions in other cases does not concern its function here 
(Dancy 2004; 2007). 
Dancy not only knows holism in connection with normative reasons to be true but also 
asserts that this theory is true in realm of values as well, i.e., X in the situation A has a 
value different from its value in the situation B, or maybe has no value at all. In regard 
with value, he puts the very two previous propositions forward: 
(1) A feature or part may have one value in one context and a different or an opposite 
value in another. 
(2) The value of a complex or whole is not necessarily identical with the sum of the 
values of its elements or parts. 
With the aid of George Edward Moore’s standpoint concerning value, Dancy describes 
this issue and explains his theory in comparison with Moore’s (Dancy 2000; 2004). 
Moore accepts the second proposition and rejects the first, because he believes in stability 
of values and knows the value to be intrinsic, but differs from Dancy in interpretation of 
the second proposition. According to Moore, the whole could be more valuable, because 
of the presence of a certain part, than could be explained by the value of that part; a part 
can contribute more, or less, value than it actually has (Moore 1903). Dancy does not 
accept this. Their views differ, because Moore accepts the supervenience theory and 
holds that the intrinsic value of something supervenes upon its other intrinsic qualities; 
and because of invariability of the value of parts, the whole value also remains the same 
in various context. 
Dancy, first of all, proposes the theory of resultance in regard with value and compares it 
with supervenience theory. This theory states that the value of each case results from 
features and can vary because of changes elsewhere. Dancy knows this value to be 
intrinsic, but he aims at something different from what Moore and others hold. He 
believes that everything has intrinsic features (value-making features) and resultant or 
intrinsic values which grounded in them. Thus, value-making features of each case 
should be considered separately from other cases because there is no common intrinsic 
feature that is invariant from case to case. The intrinsic value of an object is thus capable 
of being affected by context. Then he advances the theory of supervenience that in fact is 
similar to the theory of resultance and different from Moor’s intended supervenience. He 
calls Moore’s version a sort of local supervenience and his own version a more global 
supervenience (Dancy 2004). According to local supervenience, an object cannot change 
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in intrinsic value unless it changes in other respects, and according to global 
supervenience, an object cannot change in intrinsic value unless there are other changes 
somewhere. Thus in this theory, intrinsic value is grounded in other properties, not in its 
properties, but it can be grounded in properties of other things, in relations to other 
things, and even in the values of other things to which the value-bearer is related . 
This account requires us to offer a criterion of an intrinsic property. Dancy distinguishes 
between two features: “good-making features” and “enabling features” (Dancy 2004). 
The second type features are relevant to the value as well, but they are not playing the 
same role as that play value-making features; in fact, these are properties whose presence 
or absence can make a difference to the ability of the intrinsic properties to generate the 
value that they do. 
In this case, intrinsic value is a value that grounded in or resulted from intrinsic features 
of the object, but probably it alters owing to the changes of other features, i.e., because of 
features whose absence or presence can bring about a difference to the ability of intrinsic 
properties that are value-bearer. 
5. Evaluation 
I attempted in this paper to scrutinize theoretical differences of two approaches named 
generalism and particularism. Generalists, by a positive answer to “whether there is a 
relation between principles and moral thought or not?”, opposed to particularists. By 
believing in the dependency of rationality of moral thought on principles, they regarded 
the existence of principles in the decision making process and moral judgment as 
necessary and inevitable. However, particularists, in contrast, rejected this relationship 
and acknowledged the judgment and decision making based on recognizing special 
features of a case and relevant circumstances. Generalists defended their approach on the 
basis of atomism, and particularists on the basis of holism. 
Each approach accused its rival of committing errors. Generalists accused the other group 
of denial of principles and rejecting the rationality of moral thought, and particularists, 
after referring to generalists’ error concerning the distinction between moral and non-
moral thought, proposed a picture of rationality that is universalizable including both 
thoughts. Generalists interpreted the rationality as consistency in beliefs and viewed 
principles to be necessary for moral thinking, but particularists interpreted rational 
thinking as having adequate reasons. These reasons are not necessarily of the type of 
rules and also not independent of context. 
On the other hand, generalists accused particularists of neglecting principles, and 
particularists accused them of overlooking particular truths and conditions. Both of them 
hold that this negligence will result in committing an error in moral judgment and 
decision making. 
It is needed to ask whether generalists really neglect the particular truths and conditions 
in their judgments and particularists judge without principles or not. In view of their 
function, it seems that perspectives of the both sides are extreme, or at least none of them 
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is committed to principles and theoretical foundation of its approach. Neither do 
generalists neglect particular truth absolutely, nor do particularists see principles to be 
redundant and unnecessary. 
Studying moral theories’ function concerning the role of principles and situation in 
ethical thinking indicates that none of generalists believes that one can make a decision in 
isolation, but they see considering the situations as necessary in judgment. Therefore, it is 
possible to say that holism is compatible with the generalist view that morality can and 
should be codified. Considering the circumstances and conditions, in some kinds of 
generalism like Ross’s theory, is accepted by particularists. For this reason, Dancy (2004) 
points out that particularism is not the direct and immediate conclusion of holism because 
some forms of generalism are compatible with this approach. But among generalists, 
Ross is not the only one who has taken this position. Perhaps, virtue ethics and 
utilitarianism forego Kant’s theory in this regard. It is clear that in Aristotle’s virtue 
ethics, the rightness or wrongness of acts should be determined in context. It holds that 
what we ought to do on a given occasion depends on what virtue requires in the 
circumstances. For Aristotle, virtuous agent should recognize what action, how, why, and 
to whom should be done. In fact, Aristotle, by these particulars, tells us what an action 
consists in, and that an agent should not be regardless of these elements in decision 
making process or moral judgment. 
Classical utilitarianism believes that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is 
intrinsically disvaluable; accordingly, the maximizing of pleasure is regarded as the 
criterion for the rightness of an act. Particularists usually mention the sadistic pleasures as 
a counter-example against utilitarianism. It is obvious that none of utilitarian 
philosophers considers sadistic pleasures as valuable. I think the very principle of 
pleasure, according to which only reasonable pleasures are permissible, does not allow 
utilitarian philosophers accept them. Therefore, the fact that an action would promote 
pleasure is a reason to perform the action if and only if the pleasure is non-sadistic. John 
Stuart Mill and even Jeremy Bentham have proposed some criteria for measuring and 
determining pleasures which do not let every kind of pleasure, including sadistic 
pleasures, be valuable. Hence, the rationality which is the basis of all moral theories, 
including utilitarianism, does not let every act be right just due to being apparently an 
instance of a principle. Consequently, whether the fact that an action would promote 
pleasure is a reason for performing the action or not depends on the context. Therefore, 
utilitarianists consider special features and conditions to determine higher quality 
pleasures, or in general, the greatest amount of happiness. 
Because of his belief in unconditional rules, Kant’s theory is accused of denial of the 
sensitivity to the particular cases. However, there are reasons indicating that for Kant, 
considering the particular case is necessary while applying a principle. He recognizes that 
the application of rules requires a judgment to determine their applicability to a particular 
case, and this cannot be formulated in general terms, but is determinable by the particular 
case (Kant 1999). Then, he deems that the agent must recognize whether the act falls 
under a rule or not. In order to do it, he needs to consider a particular case in context. The 
requirement of Kant’s attention to necessity of considering cases in judgment indicates 
that he pays attention to particulars, because a case would be regarded as particular when 
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its features and the context in which it occurs are considered. 
In addition, when he tries to distinguish between suicide and deliberate martyrdom in 
Doctrine of Virtue, and questions the wrongness of the latter, while regarding the primary 
as wrong unconditionally, it shows that he accepts, in fact, some exceptions. In other 
words, for him, deliberate martyrdom is not an example of suicide, and for recognizing it, 
a judgment is required to determine whether or not the particular case is an example of 
suicide. “Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) in order to 
save one’s country?—or is deliberate martyrdom, sacrificing oneself for the good of all 
humanity, also to be considered an act of heroism?” (Kant, Doctrine of Virtue 423). 
Therefore, we can not judge about the rightness or wrongness of acts absolutely and 
abstractly regardless of situations, but we should consider cases, and for this, we need to 
regard the context. In fact, the same rationality which is the basis of Kant’s ethics 
demands us to perform the rational acts, and it is natural that in practice, we can not 
consider some acts as rational or moral without considering circumstances. This point 
will be more clear when we compare killing for self-defence with killing out of angry. 
Another point which confirms that generalists can not ignore details and conditions is that 
in all forms of generalism, in order to recognize those principles that the case falls under, 
we are required to consider circumstances and features that are decisive. To reject 
generalism and to prove that normative reasons are changeable, Dancy gives an example 
that is a good one to demonstrate this point. Suppose that I have borrowed a book from 
you. I have a reason to give it back to you, because I have borrowed it, and also I have 
reasons not to return it on the supposition that you have stolen it from the library. What 
attracts attention in this question is that changing of conditions has not brought about a 
change in reasons, but these two differ because the concept of lending has not been 
realized. Lending does make sense when one lends something to others that he or she is 
in possession of it. For this reason, the mere act of borrowing a book does not provide a 
reason to giving it back; we should observe that whether this particular case is an special 
instance of borrowing or not; then with the principle connected to it, one can come to this 
conclusion that he must return it or not. Therefore, acceptance of generalism does not 
force us to apply principles on particular cases unreflectively, but permits us to interpret 
the case while judging. Then, it is apparent that generalists have not overlooked particular 
facts in recognizing a proper judgment. 
Of course, considering situations by generalists does not mean that they do not believe in 
intrinsic value of acts. But the point is that, generalists also, like particularists, accept that 
in some circumstances, some acts can not manifest their inner value. On the other hand, 
Dancy, like generalists, also admits that the intrinsic properties may be the same in 
various contexts. The point lies in enabling features which Dancy attempts to distinguish 
from value-making features. And by emphasizing the role of enabling properties in 
changing the intrinsic values, he distinguishes between generalism and particularism. 
But, I think, there is no difference (or at least no important and effective one) between 
them in these regards, and eventually, both approaches reach a common point about 
principles and context although they may not confess to that frankly. 
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In other words, both generalists and particularists believe that properties of an act, in 
different situations, are the reason to do it. But since particularists suppose that there is a 
possibility of change in circumstances, they conclude that properties of an act in different 
contexts may and may not be the reason to do it. On the other hand, generalists state that 
these properties are in favour of an act unless an obstacle appears. Obstacles in their 
terms are some exceptional conditions or disablers which may happen every moment, but 
the probability of these obstacles does not make the generalists to disvalue the mere act 
basically. Hence, they accept not only the intrinsic value of acts but also the suitable 
conditions for the presence of the values. 
Particularists have the same opinion, too. That means, particularists and generalists, both 
believe in the intrinsic value-making properties unless generalists state that some special 
circumstances may inactivate the rule, and particularists state that they may inactivate the 
inner value of an object or act. 
Therefore, Dancy accepts the default value of acts and believes that different conditions 
can change this value. But this intrinsic property and its resulting value remains the same 
as long as the conditions have not changed. Consequently, if theft is considered wrong in 
a specific situation, its wrongness does not change as long as the conditions have not 
been altered. But upon an alteration in circumstances, theft could be considered right, like 
when one’s life can be saved from starvation by theft. In Dancy’s terms, conditions are 
the very enablers/disablers which help to keep or remove the default values of an act. 
Then, Dancy accepts that properties might remain similar in various contexts; he only 
insists that generalists should utilize the word “can” instead of “must” in order not to face 
a difficulty while a change in condition makes a change in the features of an act. This is 
the positive side generalists mention. 
Particularists also cannot judge about a proposition as correct or incorrect without 
considering principles and they actually do not do so. While they say that the wrongness 
of this given act is not due to the principle “stealing is erroneous” but because the stealing 
itself in this particular situation is erroneous, they seem to have an image of incorrectness 
unconsciously in their mind according to which they know the stealing in this situation is 
considered wrong. This is wrong because that the properties cause incorrectness of 
stealing is present in this case although a change in conditions may cause a change in 
features of an object and in judgment. 
According to the above-mentioned issues, it seems that the main debate between 
generalism and particularism is not over the rationality of ethics, because both 
approaches believe in the rationality of ethics in a way, and both accept either the 
generality of ethical values or the possibility of their change. In other words, both groups 
admit the stability of values basically, and also accept that particular properties can be the 
reason for doing an act. Besides, they both know that the change in circumstances may 
inactivate some specific values. The only distinction is that generalists more emphasize 
the intrinsic value of an act and its stability, while particularists insist on the 
changeability of values. In fact, neither do generalists neglect the possibility of instability 
of values, nor do particularists ignore the possibility of stability of values. 
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There are still two points I would like to refer to here. First of all, in spite of the fact that 
generalism can be compatible to holism (as mentioned), particularists also have not 
advanced a logical justification about the theory of holism. And some authors, like 
Dancy, merely on the basis of few examples and possibility of change in conditions, have 
made an effort to explain this theory. Probably for this reason, Dancy lays a great 
emphasis on the point that atomism is false and principlism is incorrect because of the 
possibility of change in conditions. He calls this attitude the moderate approach and in 
contrast, rejects the extreme approach that maintains that there is no similar feature in 
two cases. 
Moreover, moral thinking, on the basis of cases, necessitates that only persons of high 
insight are capable of making decisions just in case that they are aware of all enabling 
conditions. Dancy indicates that while judging in a particular case, we should see what is 
the contribution made by a given feature in the light of the entire context, and in order to 
achieve this, recognition of the limit of differences that occur from case to case is needed. 
However, he finds this sort of knowledge to be inarticulable and holds that, as a practical 
concept is understood on the basis of its application in sentence, in the same way, 
characteristics or features are recognized according to their application and in terms of 
situation. Therefore, according to him, the main characteristic of human practical 
rationality is to utilize this inarticulable knowledge in situations and different cases. 
Consequently, understanding the good-making features and recognizing conditions that 
make features to be able to play their grounding role is only done by special individuals. 
Besides, also in generalism, we need wise and of high insight individuals to release from 
contradiction of principles, individuals who are aware of the set of truths and principles 
and are capable of attaining the intended conclusion by means of reasoning or intuition. 
I think the above-mentioned points indicate that both particularism and generalism would 
have a long way to success if they would like to go on separately (of course if they 
could). Further, they should open new doors to reality if they are to dominate the 
problems encountered to and to appear finally as a successful theory concerning moral 
thought. 
6. Conclusion 
In general, if generalists tend to the extreme side and neglect the role of particular truths 
and conditions in moral thought, they would encounter serious difficulties. And if 
particularists totally ignore principles or general statements for cognition, they will not 
get to justify ethical thought. Therefore, we can not, in practice, stick to just one of these 
approaches and ignore the other. Moreover, if generalism and particularism are 
interpreted properly, they will not be considered as contrastive or opposing views any 
more. 
At the end, it is emphasized that moral agents, in decision making process and moral 
judgment, are not only in need of using moral principles but also must have sufficient 
awareness about truths and conditions. For this reason, both approaches have particular 
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advantages that should be taken into account by moral philosophers. 
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